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A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN
SENTENCING: TOO LITTLE LAW, TOO
MUCH LAW, OR JUST RIGHT
JUDGE NANCY GERTNER*
For the centennial of this renowned Journal, I have been asked to tell
the history of American sentencing—concisely, to be sure. The history of
sentencing in the United States can be recounted from a number of
perspectives. First, there is an institutional story—the story of the division
of labor between all of the sentencing players. Sentencing is, after all, a
system; sentencing institutions work in relation to, and not independent of,
one another. Players in the sentencing system include the traditional ones:
judges, lawyers—both prosecutors and defense—as well as the Congress,
the public, sometimes the jury, and most recently, administrative agencies.
Second, and as a corollary of that division of labor, sentencing can be
examined through the different sources of its rules and standards, which can
be common law rules crafted by judges, statutes drafted by legislatures,
regulations promulgated by agencies, or standards articulated by academic
experts, like penologists, sociologists, political scientists—the kind of
scholars who write in this estimable Journal.
Third, sentencing can be viewed through the lens of the changing
substantive law, reflecting the shifting winds of penal theory, from
rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence, to incapacitation, and various
permutations of each. Different theories of sentencing, in turn, confer
power on different sentencing players. For example, rehabilitation theories
necessarily enhanced the role of judges and parole officers, the purported
experts in individualized punishment aimed at “curing” deviant behavior.
Retributive theories did the same for Congress and the public, not to
mention radio “shock jocks” and 24/7 cable television pundits. If the most
important question was the culpability of the offender—what punishment
this crime deserved—everyone was suddenly an expert, or so it seemed.

*

Judge Nancy Gertner is a judge of the District of Massachusetts, appointed in April
1994. In addition, Judge Gertner has been teaching a year-long seminar on sentencing at the
Yale Law School for the past decade.
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Finally, the political entity in whose name the punishment is imposed
is critical: most law enforcement is the province of the state. A national
federal sentencing system, owing to what some have called the
“federalization” of crime, 1 has far different pressures—few financial
pressures (the federal government prints money, after all), and many more
political pressures—than a state one, and necessarily produces a different
sentencing regime.
This Article will range over the various stages of American sentencing
over time, focusing mostly on federal sentencing, and having these issues in
mind—division of labor, source of sentencing standards, substantive law,
and federal-state divisions and their shifting permutations.
I. COLONIAL JURIES AND SENTENCING
In colonial times, and particularly in the period before American
independence, juries were de facto sentencers with substantial power.2
Many crimes were capital offenses.3 The result was binary—guilty and
death, or not guilty and freedom. There were few scalable punishments, or
punishments involving a term of years.4 This is so because penitentiaries
were not common until the end of the eighteenth century. 5 Jurors plainly
understood the impact of a guilty verdict on the defendant because of the
relative simplicity of the criminal law and its penalty structure, and often
because of the process by which they were selected. They were picked
from the rolls of white men with property. Indeed, steps were sometimes
taken to secure better qualified people to serve on juries. Juries were hardly
representative in the sense that we understand today. 6 The substantive
criminal law was the province of the states, and was, for the most part, state

1

See Michael E. Horowitz & April Oliver, Foreword: The State of Federal Prosecution,
43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1033, 1039-40 (2006).
2
See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in
the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 869-76 (1994) (reviewing early jury trials); Judge
Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Undermining Justice: Lessons from Criminal Trials
and Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 419, 424 (1999).
3
Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV.
821, 832-33 (1968).
4
While Langbein describes this development in terms of the English jury system, his
observations apply with special force to the colonial jury. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE
ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 64 (2003).
5
SOL RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 27-30 (1973).
6
Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 432 (1996).
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common law, often deriving from cases with which the jurors were
familiar. 7
Like the modern jury, colonial jurors were authorized to give a general
verdict without explanation, but unlike the modern jury, the colonial jury
was explicitly permitted to find both the facts and the law. 8 If capital
punishment were inappropriate, they would simply decline to find guilt, or
find the defendant guilty of a lesser crime in order to avoid the penalty of
death. 9 No one disparaged this as “jury nullification.” Ignoring the law to
effect a more lenient outcome was well within the jury’s role.10 In fact,
several colonies explicitly provided for jury sentencing. 11
7
Lance Cassack & Milton Heumann, Old Wine in New Bottles: A Reconsideration of
Informing Jurors about Punishment in Determinate- and Mandatory-Sentencing Cases,
4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411, 439-40 (2007) (citing J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE
COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800 (1986)).
8
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). As
Professor Amar noted:

[I]t was widely believed in late eighteenth-century America that the jury, when rendering a
general verdict, could take upon itself the right to decide both law and fact. So said a unanimous
Supreme Court in one of its earliest cases (decided before Callender) [Georgia v. Brailsford, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794)] in language that resonates with the writings of some of the most
eminent American lawyers of the age—Jefferson, Adams, and Wilson, to mention just three.
Indeed, Chase himself went out of his way to concede that juries were judges of law as well as of
fact. Perhaps, however, this concession had to do with the pecularities of sedition law and its
somewhat unusual procedures—driven, it will be recalled, by the struggle between judge and
jury.

Id. at 1193; see, e.g., R. J. Farley, Instructions to Juries—Their Role in the Judicial Process,
42 YALE L.J. 194, 303 (1932) (“In America by the time of the Revolution and for some time
thereafter, the power to decide the law in criminal cases seems to have been almost
universally accorded the jury . . . .”); see also David A. Pepper, Nullifying History: ModernDay Misuse of the Right to Decide the Law, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 609 (2000)
(arguing that colonial juries had the right to decide the law as outlined by the Court); cf.
Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289
(1966) (distinguishing between civil and criminal juries, and dismissing Brailsford as
anomalous). But see Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to
Determine the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 131 (1998)
(suggesting that the historical record is not clear).
9
RUBIN, supra note 5, at 31.
10
Blackstone called the jury practice of convicting of a lesser charge to mitigate against
the death penalty as “pious perjury.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 239; see also THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO
CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800 295 (1985);
LANGBEIN, supra note 4, at 234-35.
11
There is some disagreement as to how widespread jury sentencing was in non-capital
cases at the time of the Constitution’s ratification. Compare Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury
Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J.
1775, 1790 (1999) (“Jury sentencing in noncapital cases was a colonial innovation.”), with
Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1506 (2001)
(“American juries at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights played a minor role in
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Thus, in the colonial division of labor, juries had a preeminent role. 12
There was no need for a priori punishment standards or rules, because there
was, for the most part, a single punishment. Penal philosophy, at least as a
formal matter, was retributive. There was little national federal law, even
after independence. Most criminal law derived from the common law and
in time, statutes from state legislatures—law with which jurors were
familiar. 13
II. THE ERA OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCING
The turn of the nineteenth century brought scalable punishments—
penitentiaries and, in time, reformatories—and thus, a more complex set of
sentencing outcomes. 14 The jury could no longer link conviction to a
particular sentence even if it had the power to sentence or decide questions
of law—and it did not. Now, they were explicitly instructed to find only
the facts; judges determined the applicable law. Federal substantive
criminal law began to evolve, although most criminal prosecutions were
still state-based. And the jury changed: it was more diverse as barriers to
serving as jurors were lifted for minorities and women, as were property
restrictions. 15 With more and more access to education, a professional class
of judges and lawyers evolved, and with it, the power of the jury declined,
including the power to affect the sentence. 16
Over time, a different division of labor evolved as between judges and
juries: juries decided liability; judges sentenced. Selection procedures
sought to insure that the jury would be selected in direct proportion to what
they did not know about the issues, or the parties.17 And that was not too

sentencing.”). Lanni reports that “as recently as three decades ago more than one-quarter of
U.S. states provided for jury sentencing in noncapital cases.” Lanni, supra, at 1790.
12
Nancy J. King emphasizes judicial power even in the colonial period through the
practice called “benefit of clergy,” which derived from seventeenth-century English law.
“Clergy was a judicial pardon of sorts,” which rested entirely with the judge after conviction.
Nancy J. King, “The Origins of Felony Jury Sentencing in the United States, 78 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 938, 948 (2003).
13
On the absence of federal criminal law, see Sarah Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime:
Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39,
41 (1996). On the fact that jurors were familiar with the law, see Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips
are Moving . . . but the Words Aren’t Clear: Dissecting the Presumption that Jurors
Understand Instructions, 69 MO. L. REV. 163, 188-189 (2004).
14
NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 4-5 (1974); see also Morris B.
Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951 (2003).
15
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 2, at 915-916 (1994).
16
Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 WIS.
L. REV. 377, 380.
17
See generally NANCY GERTNER & JUDITH H. MIZNER, THE LAW OF JURIES (2009).
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difficult in an urbanizing, diverse country. 18 Juries became more and more
passive, deferring to the professional judge.19
This was especially true by the early twentieth century, when the
dominant penal philosophy was rehabilitation and an indeterminate
sentencing regime took hold.20 In indeterminate sentencing, the judge’s
role was essentially therapeutic, much like a physician’s. Crime was a
“moral disease,” 21 whose cure was delegated to experts in the criminal
justice field, one of whom was the judge. Different standards of proof and
of evidence evolved between the trial stage and the sentencing stage,
reflecting the very different roles of judges and juries.22 The trial stage was
the stage law students studied. It was the stage of constitutional rights,
formal evidentiary rules, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. At the
sentencing stage, the rules of evidence did not apply; the standard of proof
was the lowest in the criminal justice system: a fair preponderance of the
evidence. The rationale was straightforward: it made no more sense to limit
the kind of information that a judge should get at sentencing to exercise his
or her “clinical” role than to limit the information available to a medical
doctor in determining a diagnosis. 23
Unlike other common law countries, appellate review of sentences was
extremely limited in American courts. 24 In the federal system, the “doctrine
of non-reviewability” prevailed until 1987, when the Federal Sentencing

18

With urbanization, the juries lost their “proximity to persons and events of the cases
brought before them” and “lost their capacity to inform themselves.” LANGBEIN, supra note
4, at 64. Akhil Amar describes the “present day jury” as “only a shadow of its former self.”
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 97 (1998).
19
LANGBEIN, supra note 4, at 64.
20
See Honorable Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57
ME. L. REV. 570, 571 (2005) (describing the evolution of federal sentencing).
21
See Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1187 (1993).
22
Gertner, supra note 20, at 571.
23
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), exemplified this approach. A jury
convicted Williams of first-degree murder and recommended life imprisonment. The judge
disagreed and sentenced the defendant to death. While Williams had no criminal record, the
judge, relying on the pre-sentence report that contained information inadmissible at trial,
concluded that the defendant had committed a string of uncharged burglaries, that he had a
“morbid sexuality,” and that he was a “menace to society.” Id. at 244. “Retribution is no
longer the dominant objective of the criminal law,” the Court declared. Id. at 248. Rather,
“reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal
jurisprudence.” Id. Any restrictions upon a trial judge’s ability to obtain pertinent
information “would undermine modern penological procedural policies.” Id. at 249-50.
24
See Comment, Appellate Modification of Excessive Sentence, 46 IOWA L. REV. 159,
159-60 (1960) (“The federal and majority state rule which precludes appellate modification
of seemingly excessive sentences within statutory limits seems to be a vestige of the early
common law doctrine denying any judicial review as of right in criminal cases.”).
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Guidelines became effective. 25 Likewise, only a few states had appellate
review of sentencing, and even then it was used “sparingly.” 26 A trial
judge’s authority to sentence was virtually unquestioned.
Consistent with this view of judges as the sentencing experts, Congress
took a back seat, prescribing a broad range of punishments for each offense,
and intervening only occasionally to increase the maximum penalty for
specific crimes in response to public demand. Judges had substantial
discretion to sentence, so long as it was within the statutory range. In
effect, the breadth of the sentencing range left to the courts the task of
“distinguishing between more or less serious crimes within the same
category.” 27 While prosecutors had discretion to bring the charges, which,
given the broad definitions of crimes, was not insubstantial, and defense
lawyers could argue for creative “therapeutic” solutions, the judge had the
final word. And even the judge’s sentence did not fully determine the
length of time a defendant would serve. Parole was available depending
upon the defendant’s conduct while incarcerated.
To sum up, judges and parole authorities had the most power relative
to the other sentencing players. They were the acknowledged sentencing
experts. There were few a priori rules or standards. Each case was resolved
on its own merits; to the extent there were standards, they evolved from the
day-to-day experience of sentencing individuals. There was little or no
appellate review of sentencing. And the substantive law of sentencing was
shaped by rehabilitation, a penal philosophy that necessarily reinforced the
judge’s role and limited Congress’s and the public’s. After all, neither was
in a position to second guess the judge concerning what would rehabilitate
an individual defendant. Finally, although federal criminal power was
growing, most criminal law was state originated.
As I have written elsewhere, 28 there were problems with indeterminate
sentencing, problems that sowed the seeds of the next institutional shakeup.
In fact, judges had no training in how to exercise their considerable
discretion. Whatever the criminological literature, judges did not know
about it. Sentencing was not taught in law schools; and to the extent there
was any debate about deterrence and rehabilitation—such as on the pages of

25

Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison
of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L .REV. 1441, 1444 (1997).
26
Id.
27
KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 23 (1998).
28
See Gertner, Sentencing Reform, supra note 20; see also Judge Nancy Gertner, From
Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523
(2007).
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this Journal—it was not reflected in judicial training. 29 “It was as if judges
were functioning as diagnosticians without authoritative texts, surgeons
without Gray’s Anatomy.” 30
In the absence of any review, judges had little incentive to generate
standards for sentencing which might be applied in future cases; few judges
bothered to write sentencing opinions at all. Other efforts aimed at guiding
judicial discretion, or even enhancing judicial decisionmaking, like
sentencing councils, mimicking the clinical rounds of physicians, or
sentencing information systems, were rejected.
Disparity was inevitable, although nowhere near as much as preGuidelines scholarship suggested.31 Marvin Frankel described this period
as “the unruliness, the absence of rational ordering, the unbridled power of
the sentencers to be arbitrary and discriminatory.” 32 There was no common
law of sentencing to create precedents to constrain discretion as exists in
torts or contract. Without appellate review, no common law of sentencing
could evolve. Constitutional review of sentencing decisions was limited;
Eighth Amendment or due process review was rarely invoked, and even
more rarely successful. 33 Furthermore, Congress had tried—and failed—to
rationalize the criminal code, as the American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code had done with respect to state substantive criminal law.34 The Model
Penal Code simplified state law, recommending a limited number of broad
categories based on seriousness (felonies in the first, second, and third
degrees) and mens rea. While the Model Penal Code also reflected the
prevailing views of indeterminate sentencing—the categories are still
relatively broad and judicial sentencing discretion is explicitly
acknowledged—it did frame that discretion to some degree by
systematizing offenses and listing sentencing factors a judge may consider.
So long as the federal substantive law was chaotic, with overlapping
categories and muddled distinctions among offenses, federal sentencing was
bound to seem lawless. 35

29

Stith and Cabranes note that “law faculties had long regarded sentencing as a ‘soft’
sub-specialty of criminal law, populated primarily by aficionados of psychiatry, sociology,
social work, and other such branches of the ‘social’ sciences.” STITH & CABRANES, supra
note 27, at 26.
30
Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28, at 528.
31
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 111.
32
MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 49 (1972).
33
Reitz, supra note 25, at 1443.
34
Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be
Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 179 (2003).
35
Robert H. Joost, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Is It Possible?, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 195, 202 (1997).
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III. GUIDELINE MOVEMENT
In response to widespread calls to reform the indeterminate system, a
number of states implemented sentencing guidelines. The sentencing
guideline approach introduced a new institutional player, an administrative
agency—the sentencing commission—charged with generating sentencing
standards. 36 The role of the commission, its powers vis-à-vis the other
sentencing players, and its animating penal philosophy varied from state to
state.
In 1984, the federal government entered into the act with a version of
sentencing reform that by the end of the decade would be widely criticized.
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), creating the
United States Sentencing Commission and abolishing parole.37 The
Commission was supposed to do what Congress had been wholly unable to
do, namely, to rationalize sentencing free of political influence, separate
from the ever popular “crime du jour.” At the same time, the dominant
penal philosophy changed. The public, and certain members of the
academy, gave up on rehabilitation as a central purpose of sentencing, 38
instead championing a philosophy known as “limited” retribution.39 With
that change, the locus of sentencing expertise moved from the judges and
parole authorities to the Commission, Congress, and, to a degree, the
public. Retribution made sentencing more accessible to the public and,
ironically, to Congress. What the crime and the criminal deserved could be
the subject of debate with the late night talk show host, or in time, the
blogosphere. 40
To be sure, the institutional implications of the SRA were not
immediately apparent. To some reformers, it was not clear whether the
Guidelines would become a mandatory or an advisory system, or, put

36
See generally Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A
Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 9 NW. U. L. REV. 1441 (1997).
37
18 U.S.C. § 3551--3673 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 991--998 (2006).
38
See Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INT. 22 (1974). Martinson’s 1974 work was then recanted in his later work, New
Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV.
243, 252 (1979) (noting that “new evidence” leads him to reject his prior conclusion).
39
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE
GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 14 (2004) (“This approach places primary emphasis on
punishment proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and, within the broad parameters of
this retributivism, lengthier incarceration for offenders who are most likely to recidivate.”).
40
See generally, Franklin E. Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government, and the
Decline of Expert Authority: Some Reflections on “Three Strikes” in California, 28 PAC. L.J.
243, 254 (1996).
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otherwise, whether they would supplement or supplant the judges. 41 Where
the system would land on the continuum from advisory to mandatory would
have a substantial impact on the institutional division of labor.
Some who believed that the SRA would herald a truly advisory system
pointed to such things as the fact that the Guidelines authorized a judge to
depart from its confines whenever he or she concluded there was a factor
“of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration” by the
Commission. 42 To others, the Guideline regime was unquestionably
mandatory, underscoring the fact that the Guidelines were meant to
determine sentencing outcomes in the vast majority of cases, and judges’
power to depart was intended to be exercised sparingly. 43
As a result of various factors, many of which continue to shape the
debate over sentencing today, the more onerous and mandatory vision of
the system quickly took hold. 44 Meanwhile, Congress, rather than taking a
back seat to its newly created expert Commission, followed the passage of
the SRA with a success of even more punitive mandatory minimum statutes
and “three strikes and you’re out” type sentencing enhancements. While
cause and effect may not be clear, the following trends paralleled the
Guideline movement.
A. POPULIST PUNITIVENESS

Crime became the fodder of political campaigns;45 “lenient” judges
were parodied on the evening news and the bourgeoning 24/7 cable outlets.
But the popular rage went beyond judges who were supposedly “soft on
crime.” Efforts to restrict or even eliminate judicial discretion in sentencing
paralleled efforts to strip judges of authority in a number of other areas. In
1981 and 1982 alone, more than two dozen bills stripping or altering federal
courts’ jurisdiction were introduced in the Ninety-Seventh Congress. 46 And
the anti-judge, significantly anti-federal judge language was vituperative. 47
41

Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28, at 530.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004).
43
Judge Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 261,
267 (2009).
44
For further discussion of the factors shaping sentencing, see generally Gertner, From
Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28; Gertner, supra note 43.
45
Sara S. Beale, What’s Law Got To Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and
Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 23, 49-51 (1997).
46
This discussion draws on Christopher LeConey, Rhetorical Branding of Judges as
Outlaws: Recasting the SRA of 1984 as Symptom of the Reagan-Era Anti-Judiciary Zeitgeist
(on file with author); see also Max Baucus & Kenneth Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their
Impact on the Constitution, the Courts and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REV. 988 (1982); The
Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority
42
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B. MANDATORY MINIMUMS

Congress, propelled by this atmosphere, passed a succession of
mandatory minimum statutes, statutes that were wholly inconsistent with
the SRA’s approach and surely with deference to the new “expert”
Commission. Indeed, over time Congress directly intervened in Guideline
determinations, ordering the Commission to increase this or that
guideline. 48 Congress’s role grew as the criminal law became more and
more federalized, now accounting for the prosecution of more and more
local gun and drug offenses, the kind of street crime that had traditionally
been the state’s bailiwick. 49
C. THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES

The composition of the Commission and the guidelines it drafted
exacerbated these trends. While the Commission was supposed to be made
up of sentencing experts, 50 the first Commission was not. Indeed, no one
on the first Commission had experience in the day-to-day experience of
sentencing offenders. 51 It was, as many described it, political from the

to Regulate the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 18 n.3 (1981)
(identifying bills introduced in the Ninety-Seventh Congress to strip the federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear various constitutional claims against state or local officials).
47
See LeConey, supra note 46. LeConey cites to Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina
as stating that:
Mr. President, unrestricted power has always been the mortal enemy of the rule of law. In our
day, we have learned that this is as true in the case of judges as it has been in the case of
tyrannical kings and communist dictators. . . . Federal judges have abdicated their role as
upholders of the rule of law and become instead tyrants who substitute their own personal views
for law. . . . Congress fortunately has authority to correct judicial abuses . . . I urge my
colleagues to consider the available congressional remedies and move expeditiously to put them
into law . . . . [t]he survival of the rule of law is at stake.

Id. at 1 (citing 128 CONG. REC. 32733-734 (1982) (statement of Sen. Helms)).
48
Frank O. Bowman III, Pour Encourager Les Autres, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 435436 (2004). See generally Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the
Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 19 (2003).
49
See James A. Strazzella & William W. Taylor III, Federalizing Crime: Examining the
Congressional Trend to Duplicate State Laws, 14 CRIM. JUST. 4 (1999); AM. BAR ASS’N
TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW
15, 27 (1998).
50
FRANKEL, supra note 32, at 119-20 (explaining that the commission had called for
only “people of stature, competence, devotion, and eloquence,” in particular, “[l]awyers,
judges, penologists . . , criminologists . . , sociologists . . , psychologists, business people,
artists, and . . . former or present prison inmates”).
51
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 49.
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start 52 and decidedly pro-prosecution. 53 Without the patina of real
sentencing expertise on the Commission, much less real independence,
Congress had no problem regularly intervening in the Commission’s
decisionmaking and regularly ignoring it.54
Additionally, the Commission made a number of problematic
decisions in its initial drafting that had important institutional
consequences. The Guidelines were complex and numerical. In an effort to
minimize judicial discretion, they were keyed to the “objective” facts of the
offense and the offender, such as the quantity of drugs or the amount of loss
on the one hand and criminal record on the other. It rejected mens rea, the
traditional basis for moral culpability, or other factors that judges had taken
into account in the pre-Guidelines era. 55
And the Guidelines were severe, far more punitive than federal
sentencing had ever been. While the Commission claimed to base the new
Guidelines on existing practice, its data were limited and its analysis
skewed. Moreover, it simply took existing sentencing lengths and then
increased them. Notably, it chose to use Congress’s mandatory minimum
sentences as the base levels for the Guidelines, in effect requiring sentences
even above the levels that Congress had set.56 Indeed, the Guidelines
resulted in a marked increase in the percentage of all defendants sentenced
to prison rather than probation, and for markedly longer terms of
imprisonment. 57 The severity of the Guidelines necessarily increased the
52

SENTENCING MATTERS 63 (Norval Morris & Michael Tonry eds., 1996) (“Most
proponents of guidelines have seen its one-step-removed-from-politics character as a great
strength. . . . The U.S. Commission, by contrast, made no effort to insulate its policies from
law-and-order politics and short-term emotions.”).
53
Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 763-64 (2005)
(describing the extent to which the United States Sentencing Commission was “stacked” in
favor of prosecution interests from its inception and throughout its history).
54
See id. at 765-69.
55
See Gerald E. Lynch, The Federal Guidelines as a Not-So-Model Code, 10 FED.
SENT’G REP., July-Aug. 1997, at 25; Jack B. Weinstein & Fred Bernstein, The Denigrating of
Mens Rea in Drug Sentencing, 7 FED. SENT’G REP., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 121.
56
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, § 3 (2000) (indicating that the
Commission departed from existing sentencing practice to increase drug sentences because
of Congressional directives); id. at ch. 1, pt. A, § 4(g) (2000) (indicating that the provisions
of the Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986—setting up drug mandatory minimum sentences—
trumped the SRA’s requirement that the Commission consider the impact on prison
populations); id. § 2D1.1 cmt. background (2000) (describing the relationship between the
drug base offense levels in the guidelines and the 1986 statute).
57
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 39, at 46 (“Average prison time for federal
offenders more than doubled after implementation of the Guidelines.”); see also id. at 43
(examining the drop in federal sentences to probation); ALLEN J. BECK & DARRELL K.
GILLIARD, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1994 (1995) (discussing numbers of federal
inmates), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/.
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power of the prosecutor who could now credibly threaten substantial
sentences to extract guilty pleas.
The Commission chose to implement a “real offense” system, which
allowed a judge to consider additional facts about the criminal conduct of
the defendant, beyond the offense of conviction, and under the usual
sentencing standard, a fair preponderance of the evidence. 58 Moreover, the
requirement to consider uncharged conduct that was part of the “real
offense” led to the requirement that a judge consider even “acquitted
conduct.” 59 While a judge, pre-Guidelines, had the discretion to consider
uncharged conduct or acquitted conduct, post-Guidelines, it was mandatory,
and that conduct came to have specific determinate consequences—an
increase in one’s sentencing score and a concomitant increase in one’s
sentence. 60 And “real offense” sentencing also enhanced the prosecutor’s
power to determine what to charge and what to leave in reserve for
sentencing, under a lesser burden of proof and few evidentiary standards.
And these decisions, effectively out of whole cloth, not correlated with
the purposes of sentencing on the one hand, or empirical data, on the other,
had an impact on judges.61 Kate Stith and Jose Cabranes said it best:
[T]he Guidelines are simply a compilation of administrative diktats. A set of
unexplained directives may warrant unquestioning obedience if they are thought to
constitute divine revelation or its equivalent (the Ten Commandments come to mind),
but this is not a common occurrence in human affairs—at least not in democratic
societies. . . . The Commission’s reluctance to explain itself to the public thus leaves
us with a set of rules promulgated and enforced ipse dixit—because the Commission
says so. In the absence of some reasoned explanation for a particular rule, it is
difficult to understand, much less defend, the rule. Unless there is reason to believe
that the Commission has some unusual capacity to discover important or eternal
truths, its argument from authority leaves the Guidelines with little or no independent
62
validity or legitimacy.

58

See David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403, 418-19 (1993).
59
Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 48, at 21 (noting that members of the Commission
could not articulate a philosophy of sentencing to explain the Guidelines’ priorities). While
there is no Guideline provision explicitly requiring the consideration of acquitted conduct, it
is part and parcel of "real offense" and the courts have concluded there is no justification for
not considering it. In fact, all efforts to amend the Guidelines to exclude consideration of
acquitted conduct have failed. See 57 Fed. Reg. 62,832 (Dec. 31, 1992); 58 Fed. Reg.
67,522 (Dec. 21, 1993); see also Barry L. Johnson, If at First You Don’t Succeed—
Abolishing the Use of Acquitted Conduct, 75 N.C. L. REV. 153 (1996).
60
Gertner, supra note 2, at 434.
61
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 59-66.
62
Kate Stith & José Cabranes, Judging under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW.
U. L. REV. 1247, 1271-72 (1997).
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D. THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

This quality of the Guidelines—administrative diktats—then had an
influence on the courts charged with applying them. As I have written
elsewhere, 63 federal judges at both the trial and appellate levels could have
played a critical role in mitigating the harsh effects of this Guideline
system. They could have created a robust law of departures, or they could
have critically evaluated them in formal opinions. Instead, the federal
judiciary, which had overwhelmingly opposed the Guidelines, suddenly
became wholly “passive” in their sentencing decisionmaking. 64 They
enforced the Guidelines with a rigor required by neither the SRA nor the
Guidelines. 65 This response was due in part to a continuation of conditions
that existed prior to the promulgation of the Guidelines, the flaws of the
indeterminate era. Judges still lacked training on how to sentence, and
many did not have backgrounds in criminal justice. As a result, many
judges—especially those who arrived on the bench after the Guidelines
were promulgated—had no perspective independent of the Guidelines and
no critical context within which to judge the Guideline outcomes. To them,
the Guidelines seemed to define the fair sentencing outcome; it was the
only one they knew. In part, judges mechanically followed the Guidelines
because of how the federal guidelines were crafted and sold to them—what
I have described as a civil code ideology of sentencing reform created by
the SRA and the Guidelines. 66 They believed that experts promulgated the
comprehensive Guidelines, that they were based on empirical data, and that
any gaps in their coverage were best filled by the expert Commission, rather
than by the common law rulemaking of the federal bench.67 They believed

63

See generally Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28.
Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of Federal Sentencing: The
Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 93-94 (1999).
65
See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1720-21& n.199 (1992).
66
Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28. John Merryman’s
description of civil code judges resonated under the SRA:
64

The judge becomes a kind of expert clerk. . . . His function is merely to find the right legislative
provision, couple it with the fact situation, and bless the solution that is more or less
automatically produced from the union. The whole process of judicial decision is made to fit
into the formal syllogism of scholastic logic. The major premise is the statute, the facts of the
case furnish the minor premise, and the conclusion inevitably follows.

Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28, at 534 (quoting JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN
EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 36 (2d. ed. 1985)).
67
See United States v. Wilson (Wilson I), 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 915, 920 (D. Utah 2005)
(noting that the Guidelines are entitled to “heavy weight” because of these assumptions);
United States v. Wilson (Wilson II), 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Utah 2005); United States v.
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this—and many still do—even though these assumptions were flawed, as
recent Supreme Court case law has suggested. 68 The Guidelines’
Introduction acknowledges that they are not comprehensive but rather have
gaps intended to be filled in by judges’ power to depart.69 Nor have they
been drafted by sentencing experts, at least not the kind of experts
envisioned by the SRA. Nor are they based on data or keyed to the
purposes of sentencing.
In any event, even though the Guidelines were in fact enforced as if
they were mandatory, that was not sufficient for some members of
Congress. In 2003, Congress passed the PROTECT Act. 70 The Act sought
to eliminate virtually all departures from the Guidelines by creating a
reporting mechanism for the judges who were not “compliant.”
The result was a division of labor that gave extraordinary power to
prosecutors who could effectively determine sentences, either by what they
charged in the first instance or what they held in reserve for the sentencing
“real offense” determination. It also gave power to Congress, which could
also determine sentencing outcomes through mandatory minimum
sentences or its edicts to the Commission. The power of judges to sentence
was substantially diminished; parole had been abolished since the
implementation of the Guidelines. Congress and the Commission became
the exclusive source of sentencing rules. While the SRA was supposed to
implement all of the purposes of sentencing, retribution was in fact the
dominant philosophy. And with a growing federal criminal code, the
federalization of crime, there were few external constraints on Congress.
Unlike in the states, the federal correctional budget was a fraction of the
total budget. 71
IV. UNITED STATES V. BOOKER: REENTER THE JURY
The implementation of the SRA sowed the seeds of a major
constitutional challenge to the Guidelines. Under the still broad definition
of crimes—the chaotic federal criminal code remained unchanged—the jury
only found facts necessary to delineate the outer limits of punishments,

Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 370-76 (D. Mass. 2005) (criticizing Wilson II); see also Gertner,
From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28, 534-35.
68
Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009); United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S.
85 (2007).
69
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A1, introductory cmt. 4(b) (2010);
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 cmt.5.
70
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650.
71
Frank O. Bowman, Beyond Bandaids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal
Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 172 n.131 (2005).
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facts that would trigger the application of the still broad statutory
sentencing ranges. Then at the sentencing stage, the judge was obliged to
make additional findings of fact in order to determine exactly where the
offender fit in the sentencing grid. What was becoming more and more
clear was that the judge was now nothing more than another fact finder,
rather than a sentencing expert exercising any sentencing judgment, adding
any kind of expertise. His or her job was to find facts with determinate
numerical consequences under the Guidelines, a job which began to look
more and more like the jury’s.
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court handed down United States
v. Booker, 72 which held that the Guidelines were unconstitutional because
of their impact on the jury. The Court found that the Guidelines violated
the Sixth Amendment precisely because they obligated judges to find facts
with the determinate consequences of increasing a defendant’s sentence
beyond the range required by a jury’s verdict or a guilty plea. 73 Suddenly,
the jury was important in the sentencing division of labor, although as I
have described, the jury of the twenty-first century looked nothing like the
powerful colonial jury. This constitutional defect, according to the Court,
required severance of the provisions of the SRA that made the Guidelines
mandatory. 74 The Court deemed the Guidelines to be “advisory,” such that
judges were to “consider” Guideline ranges but were permitted to tailor
sentences in light of other statutory concerns.75
In effect, making the Guidelines advisory restored judicial power or
more specifically, judicial expertise to the sentencing calculus:
When [sentencing was] indeterminate and juries determined guilt or innocence, judges
exercised “therapeutic judgment” within the broad limits set by the Congress. What
the jury did was different from what the judge did. As the Guidelines became
mandatory, what the judge did and the jury began to look alike, finding facts with
mandatory consequences. In effect, Booker announced that in order to avoid the
constitutional consequences of the mandatory regime, the courts had to exercise
76
judgment again. The Guidelines had to be advisory . . . .

In particular, a sentencing judge was instructed to follow the SRA’s
directive to weigh a number of factors, including “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant.” 77 The sentencing court was also advised to consider the
purposes of sentencing listed in the Act, which include not only the
72
73
74
75
76
77

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Id. at 237.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 266, 270.
Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28, at 536.
Booker, 543 U.S. at 250.
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retributive goals concerning the seriousness of the offense, but also the
prevention of recidivism, the deterrence of future criminality, and the
rehabilitation of the offender.78
At first, not much happened. The trends that predated the decision
continued afterwards. Even after the Supreme Court declared mandatory
application of the Guidelines to be unconstitutional, many judges continued
to believe in the ideology of the Guidelines and urged continued deference.
Many judges seemed to be uncomfortable exercising the discretion they
now had. Many continued to use the numbers in the Guideline framework
as a point of reference, illustrating the phenomenon known to cognitive
researchers as anchoring. 79
But in a series of four cases after Booker, the Court made it quite clear
that it meant what it had said. In Gall v. United States, 80 the Court held that
a judge could consider factors, such as offender and offense characteristics,
regardless of whether they were allowable under the Guidelines. With
Kimbrough v. United States 81 and Spears v. United States, 82 the Court
indicated that a trial judge could even reject advisory Guidelines based
solely on policy considerations, such as a conclusion that the applicable
Guideline did not properly reflect national sentencing data and empirical
research. And in Nelson v. United States, in a per curiam decision, the
Court reversed a within-Guideline sentence, holding that “[t]he Guidelines
are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are also not to be
presumed reasonable.” 83
It is too early to say concretely what Booker and its progeny will do to
the sentencing division of labor. It is clear that Booker has enhanced the
position of the judge, whose sentencing expertise has been formally
acknowledged again, at the cost of diminishing the position of the
Sentencing Commission. Booker stripped the Guidelines of the force of
law, transforming the Commission into a more traditional administrative
agency, now subject to review akin to that required by the Administrative
Procedure Act. 84 Congress’s role, to a degree, is unchanged, so long as it

78

Id. at 264.
Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 15 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 137, 137 (2006), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/50.pdf.
80
552 U.S. 38 (2007).
81
552 U.S. 85 (2007).
82
129 S. Ct. 840 (2009).
83
129 S. Ct. 890, 891 (2009) (per curiam).
84
See Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing
a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217 (2005); cf. Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946 § 10, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701--706
(2006)) (describing the scope of judicial review of administrative decisions).
79
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continues to legislate mandatory minimum statutes, although its influence
on the Commission no longer translates into a direct influence on
sentencing. The prosecutor’s role is somewhat diminished to the extent that
his or her charging decisions are no longer effectively outcome
determinative. But given the remaining arsenal of federal offenses with
mandatory minimum sentences, or enhanced penalties, that reduction is
hardly substantial. And the role of the jury, whose diminished position was
the initial concern of the Court in Booker, has effectively not changed.
While retribution remains an important purpose of sentencing, the
other purposes of the SRA—including rehabilitation—have new importance
in the federal sentencing scheme, making sentencing outcomes more
complex and, I would argue, far more fair. Federal judges have an
opportunity to participate in fashioning new sentencing standards, alongside
the Sentencing Commission and Congress, although it is not at all clear how
much they will use their power.
One might argue that Booker should bring new experts to the
sentencing system. It invites scholars, judges, lawyers, and legislatures to
participate in a multilayered discussion about federal sentencing, a
discussion that had been largely squelched in an era of Guideline diktats. In
fact, it invites just the kind of discussion that this Journal has encouraged
for the past one hundred years.
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